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Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.:
But Don't Quote Me On That
The first amendment provides that Congress shall make no law
which abridges the freedom of speech or press.' In the landmark
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 the United States Supreme
Court established that public officials3 must prove actual malice4 to
recover damages for libelous 5 statements regarding their official con-
duct. 6 This requirement of proving actual malice to recover damages
for libelous statements was extended to public figures7 in Curtis
1. U.S. CoNrsT., amend. I. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
("freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States").
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (defining public officials, for the
purpose of the actual malice standard, as those officials who are so important that the public
is independently interested in their qualifications and performance, beyond the general public
interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees). See also RESTATE-
mENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 580A comment b (1977) (describing who constitutes a public
official).
4. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (defining actual
malice as a statement published with knowledge of falsity or with a reckless disregard for the
truth); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976) (describing actual malice
as a term of art, distinguished from the common law definition that centered on the defendant's
attitude toward the plaintiff); L. TamE, AMEiCcAN CONSTTToIONAL LAW 864 n.21 (2d ed.
1988) (distinguishing the constitutional standard of actual malice established in New York
Times from the common law meaning of spite or ill will). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRTs § 580A (1977) (describing the element of actual malice that a public official or public
figure must establish to recover in a defamation action).
5. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977) (describing libel as a publication
of defamatory matter by written or printed words or some similar physical form of commu-
nication); CAL. Crv. CODE § 45 (West 1982) (defining libelous speech).
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
7. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (defining three classes of
public figures, including all-purpose public figures, involuntary public figures, and voluntary
limited-purpose public figures). In Gertz, Justice Powell explained the categorization of public
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Publishing Co. v. Butts.' Application of the actual malice standard
has undergone continuous change and refinement since the Supreme
Court's 1964 decision in New York Times.9 Several United States
Circuit Courts of Appeal have applied the actual malice standard to
cases in which the allegedly libelous statement is contained in quo-
tation marks attributed directly to a speaker.10 The United States
Supreme Court, however, has not directly addressed the question of
whether clear and convincing evidence of actual malice can turn upon
proof that a quote attributed directly to a public figure was knowingly
or recklessly altered."
In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,'12 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a deliberately altered
quote attributed directly to a public figure is not per se clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice, provided the quote is a rational
interpretation of an ambiguous statement or does not alter the
substantive content of what the speaker said. 3 The plaintiff unsuc-
cessfully contended that the allegedly fabricated quotes were sufficient
to establish actual malice.' 4 The Court's refusal to find actual malice
reinforces the constitutional privilege 5 accorded defendants in libel
figures:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that
he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly,
an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public contro-
versy and thereby becomes a public figure. In either case such persons assume special
prominence in the resolution of public issues.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 580A comment c (1977) (describing the origin
of the public figure distinction and criteria for determining if a person is a public figure for
purposes of a defamation action). See generally Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206,
209-10 (7th Cir. 1976) (talk show host and entertainer Johnny Carson admitted he was a
public figure, and the Court classified Carson as an all-purpose public figure).
8. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (discussing Curtis).
9. See infra notes 40-142 and accompanying text (summarizing important changes and
cases regarding the actual malice standard).
10. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (see infra notes 73-83
and accompanying text); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied
sub nom., Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977) (see infra notes 84-100 and
accompanying text); Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir.
"1987) (see infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text).
11. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1989).
12. 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989).
13. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453-61.
14. Id. at 1453. See infra notes 160-78 (summarizing the facts of Masson).
15. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264, 283 (1964) (describing the
actual malice standard as a privilege required by the first and fourteenth amendment protections
of freedom of speech and of the press). See also Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WAsH.
& LEE L. REv. 535, 539-43 (1988) (describing the New York Times decision as creating
constitutional privileges making it more difficult for a public figure or public official to recover
in a libel action). But see REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 580A comments a & e (1977)
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actions brought by public officials and public figures.16 Public figures,
who must establish actual malice to recover for injury to reputation
in defamation actions, already face a greater burden than that placed
on private figure plaintiffs.17 Private individuals do not have to prove
actual malice in defamation actions involving statements of public
concern to recover damages for actual injury.' A complete discussion
on private figure plaintiffs, however, is beyond the scope of this
Note,
In addition to the impact of Masson on defamation law, the case
also presents potentially troubling problems for journalists and news-
paper readers. Specifically, the decision could further erode the
public's trust in the media when the public realizes that quotation
(describing the New York Times decision as creating a constitutional restriction on public
officials for recovery for defamation, and describing as misleading the classification of actual
malice as a constitutional privilege).
16. See Henry, The Right to Fake Quotes, Tam, Aug. 21, 1989, at 49.
17. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (defining private figures
as those people who have not accepted public office, assumed an "influential role in ordering
society," or relinquished any part of the interest in the protection of their names); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 580A comment d (1977) (outlining the added burden of actual malice
that public figure and public official plaintiffs must demonstrate to recover in a defamation
action). See also Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LE L. REv. 535, 540
(describing the greater difficulty public officials and public figures face to recover for defa-
mation).
18. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348. The United States Supreme Court determined in Gertz that
proof of actual malice by a private figure was necessary only for recovery of presumed and
punitive damages. Id. at 349-50. The Court announced that states could determine for
themselves the standard of liability for actual damages in private figure actions, so long as
they did not impose liability without fault. Id. at 349. In deciding against extending the actual
malice protection to defendants in cases involving private figures, the Court reasoned that the
states' strong and legitimate interest in compensating private individuals for harm to reputation
outweighs the first amendment concern for protecting speech. Id. at 343-48. Because private
individuals do not relinquish protection of their names by seeking public office or playing an
influential role in society, the Court reasoned that private individuals have a more compelling
need for redress of injury to reputation and the higher burden of actual malice should not
apply. Id. at 345. The Court further stated that private individuals have less access to media
channels of communication to contradict errors or lies about their reputations than do public
officials and public figures. Id. at 344. The Court reasoned that this lack of ability to respond
to attacks makes private individuals more vulnerable to injury, thus increasing the interest of
the state in protecting private figures. Id.
See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greennoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In Dun
& Bradstreet, the United States Supreme Court distinguished between speech of public concern
and speech of private interest, holding that a private figure plaintiff can recover presumed
and punitive damages without a showing of actual malice where the speech is not of public
concern. Id. at 761. The Court applied the analysis used in Gertz, balancing the state interest
in compensating a private individual for injury to reputation against the first amendment
interest of protecting speech not of public concern. Id. at 757. The Court reasoned that speech
not involving matters of public concern is of reduced constitutional value and does not require
the constitutional protection of the actual malice standard when the plaintiff is a private
person. Id. at 759-63. Speech of public concern, on the other hand, is central to first amendment
protection. Id. at 758-59.
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marks really do not signal that the speaker actually said the words
captured inside them, but rather denote that the words are subjec-
tively created by a reporter. 19
Part I of this Note will discuss the legal background of the actual
malice standard, including its application in defamation actions in-
volving direct quotations.20 Part I also examines journalistic practices
and standards regarding the use of quotation marks.2' Part II dis-
cusses the majority and minority opinions in Masson.22 Part III of
this Note analyzes and compares Masson with other defamation
cases, particularly those cases cited by the Masson majority. 23 Finally,
part IV considers the legal ramifications of the Masson decision and
its potential impact on journalism. 24
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to fully comprehend the application of the actual malice
standard to cases involving intentionally fabricated quotes attributed
directly to a public figure plaintiff, one must explore the purpose
and policies upon which the actual malice standard is founded.
A. Development of the Actual Malice Standard
The United States Supreme Court first accorded constitutional
protection to media defendants in defamation actions brought by
public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan.2 The Court did this
by creating the actual malice standard. 26
1. New York Times v. Sullivan: Establishing the Actual Malice
Standard
In New York Times, the United States Supreme Court held that a
public official plaintiff must prove, with clear and convincing evi-
19. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text (explaining the potential further erosion
of journalistic credibility that could result from Masson).
20. See infra notes 25-159 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 160-213 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 214-32 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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dence, that the defendant acted with actual malice in publishing
untruthful factual statements about the plaintiff's conduct in an
official capacity. 27 In New York Times, the alleged defamations were
contained in a full-page, printed advertisement paid for by a civil
rights committee.28 The advertisement contained factual inaccuracies
in its description of civil rights demonstrations in Alabama. 29 Sullivan,
a commissioner of the city of Montgomery, Alabama, brought suit
for defamation in state court.30 The Supreme Court of Alabama
affirmed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff.31 Under the
Alabama law applied by the trial court, to recover actual damages,
once the content of the statements of the defendant was established
as libelous per se, the defendant had no defense as to the stated
facts unless the defendant could show that the statements were
completely true. 32 Citing the importance of the constitutional issues
of free speech and press involved in the case, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case, and reversed
judgment.
33
By requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant acted
with actual malice-that is, with a knowledge of the falsity of what
was published, or with a reckless disregard toward the truth-the
United States Supreme Court increased the plaintiff's burden of
proof, to protect the media from liability for what the Court saw as
inevitable errors in the context of free debate. 34 The Court reasoned
that a rule requiring a critic of official conduct to guarantee the
truth of all factual assertions would lead to self-censorship. 3 For
instance, reporters might be less aggressive in reporting and com-
menting, fearing that any factual error, no matter how small or
innocent, could result in a successful defamation action. 36 Addition-
ally, the Court held that a mere showing of the defendant's negligence
27. Id. at 279-80, 285-86.
28. Id. at 256-59.
29. Id. at 258-59.
30. Id. at 256.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 267.
33. Id. at 264.
34. See id. at 271-72. See generally Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 783-84 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that at least six members of the
Supreme Court today agree that the rights of the media are no greater or less than those of
other individuals or organizations in defamation law).
35. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
36. See Comment, American Defamation Law: From Sullivan, Through Greenmoss and
Beyond, 48 OEUo ST. L.J. 513 (1987) (describing the chilling effect that such a strict standard
would have on journalists).
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would not constitute actual malice.37 Reasoning that there is a strong
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited and wide-open, the Court found that defen-
dants need breathing space within which to make such factual errors.
38
The actual malice standard allows defendants this necessary breathing
room.
39
2. Extending the Actual Malice Standard to Public Figures
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts4 extended the actual malice standard
to protect defendants in defamation actions brought by public fig-
ures. 41 The Saturday Evening Post published an article that accused
the plaintiff, athletic director and the former head football coach of
the University of Georgia, of conspiring to fix the outcome of a
football game.42 Butts filed suit for libel, contending that the mag-
azine had departed from the standards of good investigation by
acting in a reckless and wanton manner. 43 The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff.44 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and
the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the plaintiff satisfied even
the heightened protection accorded to the defendant.
45
In extending the protection afforded by the actual malice standard
to public figures, Chief Justice Warren, concurring in the result,
reasoned that public figures, like public officials, are often influential
in society and are more likely to have access to media channels to
37. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 287-88.
38. Id. at 270-72.
39. Id. at 279-80.
40. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (the Supreme Court also considered Associated Press v. Walker
in the Curtis opinion).
41. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 163-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (stating that the New York
Times actual malice standard should be applied in cases brought by public figures as well as
public officials). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 (1974) (stating that a
majority of the Supreme Court in Curtis agreed with Warren's concurrence that the New York
Times test should apply to criticism of public figures as well as public officials); Comment,
American Defamation Law: From Sullivan, Through Greenmoss, and Beyond, 48 Omo ST.
L.J. 513, 517 n.51 (1987) (citing Justice Warren's opinion as controlling).
42. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 135.
43. Id. at 137-38.
44. Id. at 138.
45. Id. at 138-39, 156. The Court stated that a public figure must show "highly unrea-
sonable conduct" by the defendant "constituting an extreme departure" from ordinary
standards of reporting to recover damages in a defamation action. Id. at 155. Chief Justice
Warren, concurring in result, stated that the applicable standard for public figures is the same
actual malice test stated by the Court in New York Times. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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voice their own criticisms and to respond to character attacks. 46 In
addition, society has a legitimate interest in the conduct of public
figures, and freedom of the press to engage in debate about the
conduct of public figures in public events and issues requires height-
ened protection. 47 In comparison, private individuals have less access
to media channels of communication, and therefore have a lesser
chance of rectifying falsehoods through means other than litigation.48
The actual malice safeguard is thus warranted in defamation actions
involving both public figures and public officials. 49
B. Actual Malice and the Rational Interpretation Standard
In Time, Inc. v. Pape,5 0 the United States Supreme Court held
that the defendant's omission of the word "alleged" in an article
summarizing the allegations of a complaint contained in a government
publication did not establish actual malice." The case centered on a
Time magazine article about a report prepared by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights. 2 The government report, in part ex-
amining police brutality, contained a section about violations of the
Federal Civil Rights Acts by Chicago police officers alleged in Monroe
v. Pape.53 In summarizing the contents of Monroe's complaint, Time
failed to indicate that the charges of police brutality were only the
allegations made by the plaintiff, rather than the conclusions of the
Commission. 4 Pape, a detective involved in the raid in Monroe, sued
Time for libel.
55
The Court reasoned that the article was a rational interpretation
of a lengthy document filled with ambiguities.56 The Court concluded
that where the alleged libel consists of a misinterpretation of the gist
46. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
47. Id. (Warren, C.J., concurring).
48. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
49. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
50. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
51. Time, Inc., 401 U.S. at 290. See generally Smolla, "Where Have You Gone, Walter
Cronkite?": The First Amendment and the End of Innocence, 39 ARK. L. REv. 311, 316-17
(1985) (discussing Time, Inc. v. Pape and stating that the decision means that when the facts
are ambiguous, the writer's choice of the most damaging inference does not by itself establish
actual malice).
52. Time, Inc., 401 U.S. at 281-82.
53. Id. at 280-83. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
54. Time, Inc., 401 U.S. at 282.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 289-90.
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of such a document, allowing the actual malice issue to go before a
jury would impose on the defendant a stricter requirement of truth
than intended by the Court in New York Times.57 Therefore, actual
malice cannot be established where the article is a rational interpre-
tation of an ambiguous document. 5 The determination as to whether
a statement is a rational interpretation is made by the trial court,
not the jury. 5
9
The United States Supreme Court later applied the rational inter-
pretation standard developed in Time, Inc. to Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of the United States, Inc.60 The Bose Court held that
a magazine's description of the sound movement from the plaintiff's
stereo system was a rational interpretation of an event filled with
ambiguities, and was thus insufficient to establish actual malice.
6
1
In Bose, the defendant's magazine, Consumer Reports, published
an article that described the sound from a sound system manufactured
by the plaintiff as tending "to wander about the room." 62 The
plaintiff brought suit for product disparagement. 63 The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered judgment for
the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently established
actual malice. 64 The district court found that since the evidence
showed that the writer knew what he heard, and that the meaning
of the language used to describe that sound did not accurately reflect
what he had heard, the writer must have realized the inaccuracy of
the statement at the time it was published. 65 The First Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, reasoning that there is a significant difference
between proof of actual malice and mere proof of falsity, and that
the plaintiff lacked additional proof of actual malice. 6
Affirming the First Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court cited the
rational interpretation test applied previously in Time, Inc. 67 The
57. Id. at 290.
58. Id.
59. See id. (stating that to permit the actual malice issue to go to the jury, once the trial
court decides the statement is a rational interpretation, "would be to impose a much stricter
standard of liability on errors of interpretation or judgment than on errors of historic fact").
60. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
61. Bose, 466 U.S. at 512-13.
62. Id. at 488. The writer's actual description of the sound in his in-house report stated
that the sound had a "tendency to wander around the room." Id. at 494.
63. Id. at 488.
64. Id. at 491.
65. Id. at 496-98.
66. Id. at 491-92.
67. Id. at 512. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (describing the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Time, Inc.).
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Court reasoned that the choice of language the writer used to describe
the sound movement, although reflecting a misconception, did not
constitute actual malice. 68 The error was of the kind common in the
forum of robust debate that the Court envisioned when it first
extended the constitutional protection of actual malice to defendants
in New York Times.69 Therefore, actual malice could not be estab-
lished when the error was a rational interpretation of an ambiguous
event.70
C. Actual Malice and Direct Quotations
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. concerned the direct attri-
bution of allegedly defamatory quotes to a public figure plaintiff.71
In reaching its decision in Masson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
focused on several defamation cases involving direct quotations. 72
These cases are examined below.
1. Carson v. Allied News Co.
In Carson v. Allied News Co.,73 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that actual malice may be inferred from
a fabricated quotation that is wholly the product of the defendant's
imagination.74 In Carson, late night talk show host and public figure
Johnny Carson brought a defamation action against a tabloid and
its publisher. 75 The article in question contained several quotes at-
tributed to Carson that were allegedly taken from conversations
between Carson and NBC executives.76 The writer of the article
apparently never heard any of these conversations and never spoke
68. Bose, 466 U.S. at 513.
69. Id. See also notes 25-39 and accompanying text (describing the United States Supreme
Court's decision in New York Times).
70. Bose, 566 U.S. at 512-23.
71. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1989).
72. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1454-56.
73. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
74. Carson, 529 F.2d at 213. The Carson court cited the United States Supreme Court's
decision in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968), for the proposition that actual
malice can be found where a story is fabricated by the defendant. Id. at 212 n.14.
75. Id. at 208, 210 (Joanna Holland, who married Johnny Carson subsequent to the filing
of this action, was also a plaintiff).
76. Id. at 212.
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with Carson about the subject.77 The writer, however, contended that
the quotes were a logical extension of the information found in
another article upon which he based his story.78 The trial court
entered summary judgment for the defendant .
79
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial,
reasoning that the complete fabrication of quotes demonstrates se-
rious doubt as to the truth of the statement and a high degree of
awareness of falsity. 80 Clear and convincing evidence of such doubts,
and 'awareness of falsity, are enough to raise a genuine issue of
actual malice and defeat the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.8' The Carson court declared that one of the fundamental
responsibilities of a journalist is to avoid inventing quotations and
attributing them directly to actual people. 2 Therefore, the Court of
Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence of actual malice to
avoid summary judgment.
83
2. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche
One year after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Carson, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled, in Hotchner
v. Castillo-Puche,14 that a knowing fictionalization of a quotation
that does not increase the defamatory impact or alter the substantive
content of the speaker's words, is not sufficient in itself to establish
liability for defamation." In Hotchner, a public figure plaintiff
brought suit for defamation and invasion of privacy against the
author and publisher of the English translation of a Spanish-language
book about Ernest Hemingway. 6 Among the allegedly libelous state-
ments contained in the book was one particularly jabbing quote
77. See id. (defendant writer testified on deposition that the article was based on material
in a research rile and information contained in an article published by a different newspaper).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 208.
80. Id. at 213-14.
81. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (stating the level of
proof required for actual malice on summary judgment); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 732 (1968) (stating that the recklessness necessary for actual malice may be found where
there is obvious reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of information).
82. Carson, 529 F.2d at 213.
83. Id. at 213-14.
84. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977).
85. Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914. The Court of Appeals gave no further criteria for
determining what constitutes a substantive alteration of content. Id.
86. Id. at 911.
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attributed to Hemingway. 7 As originally translated, the quote de-
scribed the plaintiff as "dirty and a terrible ass-licker. There's
something phony about him. I wouldn't sleep in the same room with
him." '88 The plaintiff contended that this quote itself was invented
by the author.89 However, the editors of the English translation
decided to tone down this quote.90 The published English translation
attributed to Hemingway only the words "I don't really trust him,
though." 91 The plaintiff still alleged this toned-down version of the
quote to be libelous, arguing that the publisher should be liable
because it knowingly altered Hemingway's alleged statement. 92 At
triai, the jury found that the plaintiff satisfied all elements of liability
for defamation, and the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York entered judgment for the plaintiff. 93 The court
of appeals reversed.
94
The court ruled that even if the publisher had chosen to publish
the translation of the quote describing Hotchner as an "ass-licker"
without knowingly changing it to "I don't really trust him, though"
it would not have been liable. 95 The court reasoned that because it
was impossible for the publisher to independently verify the quote,
and there was no reason to suspect the quote was not accurate,
publication of the quote would not constitute the reckless disregard
for the truth necessary to establish actual malice.96 The court reasoned
that where the publisher could not have beer1 liable for publishing
the uncut version of the quote, it could not be held liable for making
that quote less offensive to the plaintiff.97
In what may be considered dicta, the court of appeals went on to
create a substantive content test, stating that where an intentional
alteration of a quote does not change the substantive content of the
quote, the alteration itself is not sufficient evidence to establish actual
malice. 98 In the case at bar, the court found that the intentional
changes did not alter the substantive content of Hemingway's alleged
87. Id. at 914.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 912.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 914.
93. Id. at 912.
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statement. 99 The court, however, failed to provide criteria for deter-
mining what constitutes a substantive alteration. 100
3. Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc.
The rational interpretation test established by the United States
Supreme Court in Time, Inc. and Bose was applied by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers,
Inc.10 1 The Dunn Court held that direct attribution of the Spanish
word "cerdos," meaning pigs, to a public figure plaintiff who spoke
in English about littering, was a rational interpretation of ambiguous
remarks and was not sufficient to establish actual malice.'0 In Dunn,
plaintiff Thomas Dunn, the mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey, made
specific comments in English during a debate about the city's litter
problems. 03 Specifically, Dunn stated that the city was trying to
educate foreign newcomers to the city to respect the rights and
property of others and to keep the city clean' 4 A Spanish-language
newspaper, published by the defendant, ran an article about the
plaintiff's comments in which the Spanish word "cerdos," sur-
rounded by quotation marks, was used in the headline. 05 Translated
into English, the headline stated that the plaintiff had called Hispanics
pigs. 1 6 Dunn brought suit, claiming in pertinent part that the headline
was defamatory.? 7 The United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding
that the plaintiff had failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that the newspaper published the headline with actual malice. 08
The Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's decision, applied
the New York Times actual malice standard to the Spanish words
used by the defendant.'09 The Court of Appeals reasoned that there
is no exact Spanish word for litterer or litterbug, and to apply the
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987). See supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text (describing
the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Time, Inc. and Bose).
102. Dunn, 833 F.2d at 452.
103. Id. at 448.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The complete headline as translated to English stated: "Elizabeth Mayor on the
attack: Calls Hispanics 'Pigs'." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 449.
109. Id. at 452.
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actual malice test to the translation itself would be impractical."10
The Court of Appeals stated that a translation does not always reflect
the nuances of the original language, and therefore only the words
actually used by the defendant must be considered."' In holding that
"cerdos" was a rational interpretation of the plaintiff's words, the
court concluded that a mischaracterization of a speaker's words is
not sufficient to establish actual malice."1
2
D. Proving Actual Malice
As the Supreme Court first stated in New York Times, actual
malice must be proven by clear and convincing evidence."' The
criteria for determining actual malice are subjective. 1 4 The defen-
dant's state of mind regarding the veracity of the information at the
time of publication is critical"n 5 Additionally, a publisher's deviation
from professional journalism standards of reporting, while not dis-
positive, may help support a finding of actual malice." 6
1. The Editorial Process
There is no editorial privilege which protects the media from
revealing internal communications regarding editorial decisions that
might disclose the reporters' state of mind." 7 While plaintiffs have
the right to discover internal communications regarding editorial
decisions, courts are sometimes wary about intruding upon the edi-
torial decisions of journalists." 8 For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Janklow v. Newsweek" 9 stated




113. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964). Cf. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (holding that the clear and convincing standard for
proof of actual malice also applies for a trial court judge's decision on a motion for summary
judgment).
114. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979).
115. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979).
116. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 (1989).
117. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 175-77. See generally R. SMoLLA, SuriNO m PR.ss: LiBEL, THE
MEDIA, & POWER 66-71 (1986) (discussing the background and potential ramifications of
Herbert v. Lando).
118. See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1306 (8th Cir. 1986).
119. 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986).
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necessarily selective, and under the first amendment should nearly
always be left in the hands of writers and editors, not the govern-
ment.' 2° Journalists, thus, are allowed some legal latitude in struc-
turing articles in terms of both word choice and what information
to include.
Failure to investigate facts when necessary can be evidence of
actual malice.12 ' Courts are more willing to find actual malice from
a failure to investigate facts when there is no urgency for immediate
publication than when such an urgency exists. 122 A good faith claim
about the accuracy of information is unlikely to preclude a finding
of actual malice when the story is fabricated by the defendant or is
the product of the defendant's imagination. 23
In addition, an inference of actual malice can be made when a
defendant publishes a defamatory statement contradicting informa-
tion known to the defendant, even if the defendant believes the
statement is not defamatory and is consistent with the facts within
the defendant's knowedge. 124 Nonetheless, the fact that a writer
chooses to write an article that is one-sided and sets forth categorical
accusations has no tendency to prove that the publisher knew of the
falsity of the publication.' 21 Failure to check and verify facts before
publication when there is no obvious reason to doubt their accuracy
is merely evidence of negligence and is insufficient to prove actual
malice. 2'
120. Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1306. Accord Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. 3d 244, 261-62, 690 P.2d 610, 621-22, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137, 148-49 (1984). The California
Supreme Court went so far as to hold that the constitutional safeguards established in New
York Times permit journalists to exercise "literary license" in writing. Id. The California
Supreme Court cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. as an example of a court allowing the defendant a degree of
literary license. Id. The court analogized this concept to the fair and true report privilege in
California Civil Code section 47.4. Id. at 262 n.13, 690 P.2d at 621 n.13, 208 Cal. Rptr. at
148 n.13.
121. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (describing investigation as
necessary when there are "obvious reasons" to distrust the source of the information or the
accuracy of the source's information).
122. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159 (1967) (identifying story in
question as not constituting "hot news"); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 211 (7th
Cir. 1976) (noting that defendants were not facing an early deadline and had ample time to
investigate the important facts).
123. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
124. Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 645 (11th Cir. 1983).
125. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 66, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
126. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964).
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2. Professional Journalism Standards
A publisher's deviation from professional journalism standards of
reporting, while not dispositive, may also support a conclusion of
actual malice. 127 Therefore, because they may be a factor in proving
actual malice, it is helpful to consider the practices and standards of
professional journalists. 2 1
a. Journalistic Practices and Standards in General
The cornerstone of standards for journalism is the American
Society of Newspaper Editor's (ASNE) Statement of Principles,
adopted in 1923 and revised in 1975.129 These standards include
sections pertaining to truth and accuracy, impartiality, and fair
play. 30 Under the premise that a reader's faith in the accuracy of
what he reads is the foundation of good journalism, the ASNE
standards mandate that all efforts must be directed toward accurate
and unbiased articles that voice all sides of a story.' While there
has been renewed interest in such industry standards in recent years,
the standards are sometimes regarded as merely hollow philosophical
statements."'
Many journalists encourage newspapers to develop their own stan-
dards to make readers confident that reporting is accurate and
127. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 (1989).
However, evidence of a violation of internal standards may be inadmissible because the
relevance of a violation of internal rules may be substantially outweighed by misunderstanding,
confusion and prejudice. See Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (internal report prepared by CBS showing violation of its own rules in the preparation
of the 1982 television documentary The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception was inad-
missible because it did not prove the defendant's state of mind). See also Special Project,
Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their Character, and Their Legal Implications, 72
IowA L. Rnv. 637, 663-64 (1987) (discussing the relationship between media standards and
actual malice in Westmoreland). See generally R. SMoUIA, StuNs mnE PRass 198-237 (1986)
(discussing Westmoreland); FE. R. Evm. 403 (stating the rule for exclusion of relevant
evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of time); CAL. Evm. CODE § 352 (Deering
1986) (stating the California rule paralleling FED. R. Evm. 403).
128. Special Project, Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their Character, and
Their Legal Implications, 72 IowA L. Rnv. 637, 664 (1987).
129. Id. at 638-39.
130. Id. at 695-96.
131. Id. at 696.
132. Id. at 638-39.
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credible.' These standards also serve an internal function of bol-
stering writing quality. 3 4 By the mid-1980's, one study showed that
nearly sixty percent of all newspapers had adopted written Stan-
dards. 3 5
Such standards, however, are not well received by all journalists,
13 6
some of whom fear that these standards will be used against them
in defamation actions. 37 In reality, the usefulness of a newspaper's
standards to prove actual malice in defamation actions is very lim-
ited. 38 For example, in Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,' 39 an internal
report prepared by CBS showing violations of its own rules in the
preparation of a television documentary was ruled inadmissible be-
cause it did not prove the defendant's state of mind at the time of
publication. 14
Some journalists also feel that exceptions tend to swallow any hard
and fast rules that a newspaper may create, because rules cannot
adequately predict subtle variations that occur in everyday report-
ing.' 41 In this sense, any codified rules must be broad enough to
allow latitude for judgment in situations that cannot adequately be
anticipated when the guidelines are created.
42
b. Existing Standards Regarding the Use of Quotation Marks
Existing standards pertaining to the use of quotation marks fall
into two schools of thought. 43 One school adheres to the strict
interpretation standard that states that what is between quotation
marks must be a verbatim account of the speaker's words. 44 The
133. Id. at 643.
134. Id. at 649.
135. Id. at 645.
136. See id. at 643, 677; R. BEzANSON, LiBEL LAW AND Tm PREss, MYr AND REALITY
199 (1987) (describing journalists' attitudes toward codified journalism standards).
137. See Special Project, supra note 128, at 643-47 (explaining that journalists fear that
introduction of written journalism standards at trial will transform them from voluntary
guidelines to legal standards of care).
138. Special Project, supra note 128, at 665.
139. 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
140. Westmoreland, 601 F. Supp. at 69.
141. Special Project, supra note 128, at 643. Some journalists claim there are too many
exceptions in the news business to be codified by a set of rules, and that variation from
codified rules in such exceptional cases may force an editor in a libel action to explain to the
jury why the rules were violated. Id.
142. S. KLArnmAN & T. BEAucHmnP, THE ViTuous JouRNAmsT 16 (1987).
143. See M. CHARNLBY & B. CHARNY, REPonmo 248-50 (4th ed. 1979).
144. Id.
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other school believes that quotes that are accurate in meaning and
that capture the flavor of the speaker's words are sufficient.
145
The Associated Press Stylebook and Libel Manual, the self-pro-
claimed journalist's bible, adopts the strict interpretation standard.
46
The stylebook states that quotations should never be altered, even
where there are errors in grammar and word usage. 47 While minor
slips of the tongue can be removed by ellipses, the stylebook holds
that this must be done with extreme care. 148
As a practical matter, however, some journalists allow themselves
more leeway than the strict interpretation standard. 149 Syllables and
words need not be exactly what the speaker said, so long as the
quote can still be considered an acceptably accurate one that honestly
reflects the intent of the speaker. 150 As one journalist summarized
the rule, "[u]se quotation marks to surround words that are close
to what the speaker said, what the speaker might have hinted at,
what he might have said were he asked." ' ' Yet even proponents of
a less stringent standard emphasize that the journalist cannot change
the meaning of what was said.
52
There are several reasons why a quotation may be altered. Without
alteration, speakers would often seem to be incompetent grammar-
ians, speaking in halting, fragmented sentences.- 3 On the other hand,
a possible danger when changing grammar is that such practices may
make an individual appear flawlessly eloquent. 5 4
Reported quotes may also unintentionally differ from what the
speaker actually said because of the reporter's note-taking practices.155
Changes are sometimes unintentional, attributable to the circum-
stances surrounding the reporter.156 For example, it may be difficult
145. Id.
146. See AssociATE PRESS STYLEaOOK AND LBEL MANuAL. 180 (2d printing 1987).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MorvES: ETEICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEws MEDiA 70
(1976); See Turovsky, Did He Really Say That?, CoLum. JoURNALisM REv., July-Aug. 1980,
at 38-39 (describing practices of journalists regarding quotes).
150. See J. HULTENO, supra note 149, at 70-71.
151. Turovsky, supra note 149, at 38.
152. J. HuLTENG, supra note 149, at 71.
153. Turovsky, supra note 149, at 39.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See Henry, The Right to Fake Quotes, TME, Aug. 21, 1989, at 49 (including the
comments of one editor about the variations in stories reporting on comments at press
conferences).
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to hear precisely what is said by a speaker at a crowded and hastily
assembled press conference.
157
In summary, the goal of publishing strictly verbatim quotes seems
to be a lofty and practically unobtainable one."5 8 Even when a quote
is not verbatim, however, journalists agree that any changes should
be minor and should not alter the meaning of what was said." 9
II. Ti-E CASE
A. The Facts
In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., plaintiff Jeffrey Masson
contended that the defendants' defamed him and placed him in a
false light.'6 Masson, a psychoanalyst, 6' was the central figure in
two articles written by defendant Janet Malcolm for defendant The
New Yorker Magazine and later republished in the book In the Freud
Archives.162 The articles and book focused on the plaintiff's work as
projects director of the Sigmund Freud Archives, and his dismissal
from that post. 6
3
Malcolm interviewed Masson extensively on the subject, including
a week of face-to-face, tape-recorded interviews in November of
1982, as well as several telephone conversations.1 Despite Malcolm's
claim that she quoted the plaintiff almost word for word, Masson
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 143-57 and accompanying text (discussing professional journalism
standards and ethics regarding the use of quotations).
159. See J. HULTENO, supra note 149, at 70-71.
160. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989).
161. See Appellant's Brief for Appeal at 4, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881
F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-2665) (describing Masson as formerly a full professor of
Sanskrit and Indian Studies at the University of Toronto from 1975 to 1980, and trained from
1970 to 1978 in psychoanalysis).
162. See Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship, Trouble in the Archives 1, Tim Naw YORKER,
Dec. 5, 1983, at 59; Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship, Trouble in the Archives II, THm Nnw
YORKER, Dec. 12, 1983, at 60.
163. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453. See Appellant's Brief for Appeal at 4, Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-2665) (describing Masson's
acceptance of the post of projects director in 1980, and his termination from that post in 1981
because of a disagreement over a question relating to the reality of the sexual abuse of
children).
164. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1468 n.7. See N.Y. Times, July 8, 1984 (Book Review section),
at 33, col. I (letter from Malcolm describing research for the book).
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contended that the articles and book were libelous and placed him
in a false light.
165
Masson's suit centered in part on allegedly fabricated quotes at-
tributed directly to him by Malcolm. 66 Masson introduced evidence
of tape-recorded interviews to substantiate his contention that some
of these quotes were knowingly fabricated. 67 The plaintiff claimed
that the knowing fabrication of the quotes was sufficient to establish
actual malice.
161
In altering Masson's quotes, Masson contended Malcolm did more
than clean up grammatical and syntax errors. 69 For instance, Mal-
colm quoted Masson as describing himself as "like an intellectual
gigolo-you get your pleasure from him, but you don't take him out
in public.' 170 While Malcolm claimed the remark appeared in her
notes from non-tape recorded interviews, the recorded interviews did
not contain these words and the district court assumed Masson did
not refer to himself this way. "' The tapes revealed that what Masson
actually said was: "I was a private asset but a public liability. They
like me when I was alone in their living room, and I could talk and
chat and tell them the truth about things and they would tell me.
But that I was, in a sense, much too junior within the hierarchy of
analysis, for these important training analysts to be caught dead with
me." 72 Masson contended that Malcolm's interpretation of his quote
was defamatory.
7 3
Masson brought actions for libel and false light in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California. 74 Mas-
son admitted he was a public figure for the purpose of libel litiga-
tion. 7 5 As a public figure, Masson was required to prove actual
165. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1984 (Book Review section), at 33, col. I (letter from Malcolm
stating that the only changes she made in statements attributed as quotes to Masson were for
the sake of correct syntax); Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453.
166. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453. In addition to Masson's contentions that quotes were
fictionalized, Masson also claimed that quotes were misleadingly edited. Id.
167. Id. at 1453-54.
168. Id. at 1453.
169. Id. at 1456-61 (describing Masson's contentions of what he actually said and the
alleged editing changes in the quotes, made by Malcolm, that created a fictionalized quotation).
170. Id. at 1456-57.
171. Id. at 1457.
172. Id. The tapes also revealed that Masson had boasted of his ability to "charm" Anna
Freud and Kurt Eissler. Id. at 1457 n.4. The majority also found that Masson's use of the
phrase "suck stories" to describe his and other young analysts' relationships with Eissler to
have a sexual connotation. Id.
173. Id. at 1456-57.
174. Id. at 1453.
175. Id.
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malice by clear and convincing evidence to avoid summary judgment
for the defendant.17 6 The district court granted summary judgment
for each defendant, holding that evidence that the quotes were
knowingly fabricated was not in itself sufficient to establish actual
malice. 177 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
17
B. The Majority Opinion
The Court of Appeals held that actual malice could not be inferred
from the alleged fabrications that Masson claimed were defamatory,
despite the fact that the court treated the quotes as deliberately
altered. 179 In holding that the quotes were not sufficient to establish
actual malice, the court agreed with the district court that the quotes
were rational interpretations of ambiguous statements by Masson and
did not alter the substantive content of Masson's words.'80 In reaching
its decision, the Court of Appeals compared, where possible, the
words attributed to Masson with tape recordings of the interviews
between Masson and Malcolm.'" The court then determined whether
Malcolm's attributions were a rational interpretation of what Masson
said on the tape recordings, or whether they altered the substantive
content of Masson's actual words. 8 2
Judge Alarcon's opinion for the majority provided no criteria
beyond the rational interpretation and substantial content alteration
tests for determining if fabricated quotes are per se clear and con-
vincing evidence of actual malice. 8 1 Judge Alarcon cited several cases
as the legal foundation for the majority's decision.'1 While the
176. Id. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (describing the United States Supreme
Court's decision to apply the actual malice standard in cases brought by public figures).
177. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1453, 1454.
180. Id. at 1456-61.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 1454-56. The majority summarized the law on fabricated quotes before
stating.its decision, citing Carson v. Allied News Co. (see supra notes 73-83 and accompanying
text), Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche (see supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text), Dunn v.
Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc. (see supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text), Bindrim
v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied 444 U.S. 984 (1979), Time,
Inc. v. Pape (see supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text), and Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. (see supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text). Id. See infra
notes 214-32 and accompanying text (comparing Masson with Carson, Hotchner, Time, Inc.,
Bose, and Dunn).
184. See supra note 183 (listing the cases cited by the majority).
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Masson majority applied the rational interpretation and substantive
content tests in upholding the district court's decision, the majority
failed to define objective criteria or designate a step-by-step test for
determining what constitutes a rational interpretation or a substantive
alteration. 185 In summary, the Masson majority rested its decision on
a subjective comparison between what Masson alleged he said and
what Malcolm attributed to him, holding that the evidence was
insufficient to prove actual malice.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Kozinski wrote a lengthy dissent, premised on the idea that
while courts have a responsibility to protect first amendment freedom
of speech and the press, the right to deliberately alter quotations
does not necessarily accompany the right to a free press.'86 The
critical issue for the dissent was whether changes in language within
quotation marks was the type of reporter's judgment protected by
the first amendment. 8 7 Kozinski noted that the actual malice standard
already protects the press from liability for inadvertant or negligent
misquotations.'88 Focusing on the rationale behind the extension of
the actual malice standard to defendants in defamation actions brought
by public figures and public officials, Kozinski distinguished the need
to protect the press from massive liability based on errors of fact
from the right to deliberately alter quotes. 89
Kozinski stressed that quotation marks represent that a reporter is
presenting a speaker's own words, or something very close to them. 19°
His dissent found that some of the altered quotes portrayed Masson
in a materially different light from his actual words, deprecating his
reputation and character. 9 While a writer can convey negative
inferences about a person from an interview, relating that inference
by placing words in the person's mouth through the use of quotations
crosses the line "between poetic license and license," and is not
185. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453-64.
186. Id. at 1464-74 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1474 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1473-74 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1464 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). In contrast, Judge Kozinski felt that the majority
"views quotations much more amorphously: They are merely an extrapolation of the speaker's
words, as interpreted in light of his background and character". Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 1482-84 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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deserving of first amendment protection. 92 In Kozinski's view, in-
voking the "right to deliberately distort what someone else has said
is to assert the right to lie in print."1 93
Kozinski explored the practices and policies of journalists when
using quotation marks, concluding that the practice of altering quotes
is shunned by most professionals. 94 However, Kozinski acknowledged
that some breathing room should be given to defendants for cor-
recting grammatical errors.1 95
Kozinski set forth a five-step inquiry for determining whether a
plaintiff's demonstration that quotes are fabricated is sufficient to
avoid summary judgment.'9 Initially, the plaintiff must show that
the quote purports to be a verbatim version of what the plaintiff
said. 197 Kozinski noted that in some instances quotes are used as
rhetorical devices, or in admittedly hypothetical conversations.1 98 If
the quote does not purport to be a verbatim interpretation of the
speaker's actual words, there is no issue of fabrication. 99
If the court finds that the quote is intended to represent a verbatim
rendition of what the speaker said, then it must determine if the
quote is inaccurate.m This step entails an objective comparison
between what the speaker actually said and what the writer attributed
to the speaker. 20' In cases like Masson, where interviews are recorded,
a direct comparison is rather easy. 2 If the writer's version of the
quote is different from the speaker's actual words, the plaintiff clears
this hurdle.23
Next, the court must determine if these inaccuracies are material,
going beyond eliminating syntax errors and meaningless utterances
192. Id. at 1470 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1486 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1478 (Kozinksi, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1480-81 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that certain inaccuracies are not
material and are permissible).
196. Id. at 1478-82 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 1479-80 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Compare Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42
Cal. 3d 254, 263-64, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 211 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880
(1987) (California Supreme Court case holding that an explicit qualification by the writer
before a quotation, that the writer intends to convey his opinion about what the plaintiff
might have said, distinguishes the quote as a non-actionable statement of opinion rather than
fact).
199. See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1479-80 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1480 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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such as stammering. 2  Kozinski classified such changes as cosmetic
and irrelevant to the substance of the communication. 205 He defined
the introduction of new words that may convey a different meaning
to the reader, while perhaps not defamatory in meaning, as material
changes."6 If materiality is established, the court must decide whether
the material alterations are defamatory.2w The question is whether
the misquotations, when considered together, have a tendency to
injure the plaintiff's reputation. 208
If a reas2nable jury could conclude the alterations are defamatory,
then the final criterion for precluding summary judgment is whether
there is sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that the
statements were the result of actual malice. 20 This step entails deter-
mining whether the defendant knew the actual statements differed
from those attributed to the speaker or acted recklessly as to any
differences. 210 If these five criteria are satisfied, the plaintiff avoids
summary judgment and the case reaches the jury. 2
1
In summary, the Masson majority held that proof that a quote
was deliberately altered by a writer is insufficient evidence to establish
actual malice if the altered quotation represents a rational interpre-
tation of ambiguous remarks by the speaker or does not alter the
substantive content of what the speaker said.212 The dissent, setting
forth a five-step objective inquiry in defamation cases involving
fabricated quotes, suggests a much stricter test by which to judge
reporters who knowingly alter speakers' words. 213
III. ANALYsIs
To fully comprehend the impact and scope of Masson, it may help
to compare it with some of the pertinent cases the Masson majority
cited as providing a legal background for its decision. This compar-
ison will help to carve out Masson's proper niche in libel law.
204. Id. at 1481 n.20 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating as an example of immaterial changes
the substitution of "still a man" for "still a, a, a man").
205. Id. at 1481 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1481-82 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 1482 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1478-79 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 1453-61.
213. Id. at 1464-86 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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The majority in Masson cited Carson v. Allied News Co. for the
proposition that actual malice may be inferred from a fabricated
quotation when the language attributed to the plaintiff is wholly the
product of the author's imagination. 21 4 The majority, however, did
not undertake a formal comparison of the factual differences and
similarities between Masson and Carson.
Carson is factually similar to Masson in that the writer in Carson,
as in Masson, allegedly wholly invented and created words for a
public figure plaintiff, and attributed those words directly to the
plaintiff by using quotation marks. 25 Carson is distinguishable from
Masson in that the writer in Carson never interviewed the plaintiff,
2 6
but based his quotes on facts he had read in an article written by
another writer and published in another newspaper. 2 7 In contrast,
the writer in Masson personally interviewed the plaintiff and tape-
recorded these interviews.
218
Therefore, while the defendants in both Masson and Carson created
quotes, Masson is distinguishable from Carson in that the defendant
writer in Masson actually spoke with the plaintiff and had available
direct quotes on which to base a story.
Carson may be viewed as an extreme case, since the writer never
spoke with the plaintiff before fabricating quotes. In such cases, a
finding of actual malice would seem inevitable. Since the quotes
were, in essence, rational interpretations of conversations that never
took place, knowledge of falsity and a reckless disregard for the
truth are readily apparent. In cases like Masson, however, where the
reporter actually speaks with the plaintiff before fabricating a quote,
a finding of actual malice is not so inevitable.
The Masson majority's narrow characterization and application of
Carson may be misguided. In both cases, defendants allegedly com-
pletely created words and attributed them directly to the plaintiff.
In addition, both writers based their stories on some factual infor-
mation; the writer in Carson created quotes based on information
from another newspaper article, while the writer in Masson created
quotes based on conversations with the defendant. The Masson
214. Id. at 1454-56. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (1976) (giving the
specific language pointed to by the Masson majority for this proposition). See supra notes 73-
83 and accompanying text (discussing the Carson decision).
215. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976).
216. Carson, 529 F.2d at 212.
217. Id.
218. See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456-61.
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majority, however, apparently limits the application of Carson to
situations in which there are no conversations between the writer and
the plaintiff on which to base quotes, and thus Carson is not
applicable to the situation in Masson. Such a narrow interpretation
of Carson seems unnecessary, and, as the dissent suggests, actual
malice may be found in Masson by applying a broader interpretation
of Carson.219
The majority in Masson also cited Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche as
authority for the view that malice may not be inferred from inaccurate
language that does not alter the substantive content of the speaker's
words. 2  Again, the majority did not make a formal comparison
between Masson and Hotchner.
Hotchner and Masson are similar in that the alleged defamation
was contained in quotation marks. 22' However, Hotchner is readily
distinguished from Masson in that the plaintiff in Hotchner was not
the speaker of the allegedly defamatory quotation. 222 Masson, on the
other hand, is in the specific class of cases in which the plaintiff is
the speaker to whom the allegedly defamatory quote is attributed.
Therefore, the Masson majority may not be correct in applying
Hotchner's "substantive content" test to a case where the plaintiff
is the speaker to whom the quote is attributed. The holding of
Hotchner is more appropriately limited to cases in which the plaintiff
is not the speaker of the allegedly defamatory quote.
The Masson majority also points to two United States Supreme
Court decisions in setting forth the applicable law in Masson; Time,
Inc. v. Pape and Bose Corp v. Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc.n These two cases are relied on as the foundation of the
"rational interpretation" test applied in Masson.224 The Masson
219. Id. at 1472 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 1454, 1456. See Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (1977) (giving
the specific language pointed to by the Masson majority for this proposition). See supra notes
84-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Hotchner decision).
221. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1977).
222. Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 911, 914. Hotchner is also distinguished from Masson in that
the quotation in Hotchner dealt with a translation from Spanish to English. Id. at 911.
223. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971) (giving
the specific language pointed to by the Masson majority); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512-13 (1984) (giving the specific language pointed to
by the Masson majority). See supra notes 50-70 and accompanying text (discussing the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Time, Inc. and Bose).
224. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456. See Time, Inc., 401 U.S. at 290 (giving the specific language
pointed to by the Masson majority for this proposition); Bose, 466 U.S. at 512-13 (giving the
specific language pointed to by the Masson majority for this proposition). See supra notes 50-
70 and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Time,
Inc. and Bose).
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majority did not undertake a formal comparison between the facts
of these Supreme Court decisions and Masson. While these cases
both involved application of the actual malice standard, they are
readily distinguished from Masson. The principal difference is that
neither Time, Inc. nor Bosethat dealt with fabricated quotations
attributed to public figure plaintiffs. 225 Therefore, the Masson ma-
jority used a standard, developed in defamation actions that had
nothing to do with fabricated quotes, to substantiate its holding in
a case that did involve fabricated quotes. This seems to be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's application of the rational interpretation
test because it extends the test to the point of protecting writers who,
through the use of quotation marks, put words in the mouths of
speakers.
The Masson majority's characterization of the rational interpreta-
tion of ambiguities test from Time, Inc. and Bose seems flawed.
226
By extending this test to protect alterations in quotes, the Masson
majority has essentially ended the necessity for the non-quoted par-
aphrase. Applying the majority's reasoning, if a speaker says state-
ments that are ambiguous as to their meaning, a writer can still
fabricate a quote for the speaker if the writer creates a rational
interpretation of what the speaker said, and legally avoid a showing
of actual malice. There is no longer a need to use a non-quoted
paraphrase to indicate that the speaker did not actually say this
statement, and that the statement is really only the interpretation of
the writer.
Finally, the Masson majority cited Dunn v. Gannett New York
Newspapers, Inc. for the proposition that actual malice will not be
inferred where the quoted language is a rational interpretation of
ambiguous remarks by a speaker.2 7 Dunn, which did involve fabri-'
cated quotes, applied the rational interpretation test set forth in
Time, Inc. and Bose.2 As with Carson and Hotchner, the Masson
majority did not make a factual comparison between Dunn and
Masson.
225. See supra notes 50-70 and accompanying text (describing the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Time, Inc. and Bose).
226. See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1473 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (describing Judge Kozinskl's
view that the Masson majority wrongly applied Time, Inc. and Bose).
227. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1454, 1456.
228. See supra notes 50-70 and accompanying text (describing the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Time, Inc. and Bose).
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Dunn is similar to Masson in that the alleged defamation was
directly attributed in quotation marks to a public individual.? 9 How-
ever, Dunn is different than Masson because the quote was not in
the body of an article, but merely one word in a headline that was
intended to summarize the plaintiff's remarks. 20 In addition, Dunn
dealt with a Spanish to English translation for which there was no
direct translation.211 Therefore, these differences set Masson apart
from Dunn. As noted previously, the application of the rational
interpretation standard to cases involving fabricated quotes seems to
defeat the purpose of using non-quoted paraphrases, while greatly
expanding protection of the press.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in Dunn seems to
represent the best line of defense for a defendant in a case involving
fabricated quotes. The court's language that a newspaper's mischar-
acterization of a plaintiff's words is not enough to hold the defendant
liable for defamation under the New York Times actual malice
standard appears to give broad legal breathing room for fabricating
quotes.212
IV. LEGAL RAmICATIONS
Read most narrowly, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Masson represents merely a conclusion that the law
of libel is distinct from the rules of journalism.23 In other words, it
is not for journalists to tell lawyers what the law is or what it should
be. The decision also may be viewed as establishing a limit on the
license of writers to alter quotations and manufacture material.2
4
Read more broadly, the Masson decision gives journalists a limited
229. Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 1987).
230. Dunn, 833 F.2d at 448.
231. Id. at 452.
232. Id.
233. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1989, at 26, col. I (citing the opinion of Floyd Abrams,
first amendment expert, that Masson was correctly decided and represents an example that a
libel case is not a journalism seminar); DeBenedictis, No Malice in Fabricated Quotes, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1989, at 32 (citing the opinion of attorney Robert S. Warren that Masson demonstrates
that it is not the purpose of courts to teach journalism).
234. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1989 at 26, col. 1 (citing opinion of Victor Kovner, an
attorney specializing in first amendment law, that the test for determining if an altered
quotation amounts to libel is "whether the adjustments create a false context"); DeBenedictis,
No Malice in Fabricated Quotes, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 32 (citing opinion of attorney
Harold W. Fuson, general counsel of Copley Newspaper, that the test for determining if an
altered quotation amounts to libel is whether "there's an intent to falsify the meaning of the
speaker").
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right to fake quotesY 5 The actual malice standard was originally
created by the United States Supreme Court to protect the media
from inevitable errors that occur in the context of open debate on
public issues. 2 6 In Masson, however, the actual malice standard was
extended to protect intentional changes in direct quotations even
though errors were not inevitable because tape recordings were avail-
able to verify statements.
A. No Legal Guidance When Reporting: Lack of Criteria For
Determining Rational Interpretations and Substantive Content
Alterations
At first glance, the Masson decision seems to benefit journalists
by granting them limited legal leeway in altering quotes. The response
from journalists, however, has been mixed.2 7 One possible explana-
tion for journalistic displeasure is that Masson provides no fixed
criteria for determining what constitutes a rational interpretation or
substantive content alteration. The test is merely a subjective com-
parison between what the speaker claims to have said and what the
defendant ascribed to him. Masson leaves journalists with little legal
guidance when reporting quotes.238
The Masson test for actual malice may be interpreted to mean that
a journalist is not legally culpable unless he acts with the intent to
falsify the meaning of the speaker.239 On the other hand, the test
from Masson for whether an altered quotation amounts to libel could
be whether the adjustments create a false context.240
235. See Henry, The Right to Fake Quotes, Tm, Aug. 21, 1989 at 49 (stating that Masson
allows a writer to intentionally misquote a subject so long as the sense is not substantially
changed).
236. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-72 (1964).
237. See Henry, The Right To Fake Quotes, Thm, Aug. 21, 1989, at 49 (stating that while
some journalists viewed the decision as reasonable, others saw it as a Pyrrhic victory);
DeBenedictis, No Malice in Fabricated Quotes, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 32 (stating that most
journalists agreed with the dissent in Masson); Telephone conversation with Tim Grieve, staff
writer for the Sacramento Bee (Oct. 4, 1989) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal)
(describing the reaction of the newsroom staff at the Sacramento Bee as one of shock and
disbelief at the Masson decision).
238. See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text (discussing the legal standards applied
by the majority).
239. DeBenedictis, No Malice in Fabricated Quotes, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 32 (stating
opinion of Harold W. Fuson, general counsel of Copley Newspapers, on the test provided in
Masson).
240. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1989, at 26, col. 1 (stating the opinion of first amendment
attorney Victor Kovner on the test established in Masson).
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B. Erosion of Journalistic Credibility
A second possible reason for the displeasure expressed by some
journalists over the Masson decision is a fear that journalistic cred-
ibility with the public may be eroded by the decision. After Masson,
a newspaper reader should wonder if what is contained within quo-
tation marks is really what the speaker said. As the Masson dissent
noted, the right to deliberately distort words is tantamount to the
right to lie.241 Public trust in the media is already somewhat shaky;
realization that quotation marks represent little more than para-
phrases may strike yet another blow to journalistic credibility. 2
C. Impact on Journalism Instruction
The impact of Masson on journalism instruction in high school
and college remains to be seen. Future journalists may be taught
that quotation marks really don't represent the actual words of the
speaker, but rather just a paraphrase of what the speaker said. If
this is true, then it would appear that journalists should always use
quotation marks and abandon non-quoted paraphrases, provided the
quote is a rational interpretation or does not change the substantive
content of what the speaker said. The non-quoted paraphrase would
become a thing of the past.
CONCLUSION
In Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a deliberately altered
quote attributed directly to a public figure plaintiff is not per se
proof of actual malice, so long as the quote is a rational interpretation
of ambiguous remarks, and does not change the substantive content
241. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1486 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
242. See S. KIAmmAN & T. BEAucp, THE VmRoUs JOURNALIST 158 (1987) (describing
the ambivalence with which Americans view the press). See generally T. GoLDsmN, KLaNG
THE MESSENGER (1989) (collection of essays by publishers, journalists, and justices on criticisms
of the media during the past century); D. FRx, BELmvING TiE NEws (1985) (report by the
Poynter Institute for Media Studies describing panel discussions during its 1985 seminar on
credibility of the media, which focused on the image problem of the press, and including a
collection of 14 essays by media scholars and journalists on the press's image).
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of what the plaintiff said.243 The decision places an amorphous limit
on the extent to which journalists may alter quotations by employing
rational interpretation and substantive content restrictions.24 But
more importantly, the decision gives journalists legal breathing room
for knowingly altering quotes, if they meet the test described by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
However, the Masson decision fails to define a clear procedure for
determining what constitutes a rational interpretation of ambiguous
remarks, and what can be considered a substantive change in content.
Seemingly subtle semantic changes that facially appear not to alter
the content of a statement may have a large impact on the reader's
perception of what the speaker actually said. Future journalists,
however, may be instructed in high school and college that such
changes are permissible and really don't make a big difference. In
the future, a careful journalist may never have to use a non-quoted
paraphrase if it is possible to create a paraphrase, in the form of a
quotation, that does not alter the substantive content of what the
speaker said.
Public faith in the media also may have been dealt a serious blow
by Masson. A decision allowing journalists a limited right to fake
quotes certainly cannot enhance journalistic credibility. If quotation
marks are the journalistic equivalent of truth in advertising, then it




243. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456-61.
244. See id. (limiting alterations to those that are rational interpretations of ambiguous
remarks, and to those that do not alter the substantive content of the speaker's words).
